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CASE NOTES

If the standard of care can be properly induced, the Riley case represents the growing trend towards a realistic viewpoint of what standard
of care and skill is required of a physician and surgeon in the U.S. today.
A physician today should not be required to meet only the standard
set by other physicians in his locality-but should be required to have
such skill as capable members of the profession ordinarily possess under
similar circumstances, and one of these circumstances is his locality
and the opportunities it affords for keeping abreast of advances in medical
knowledge and science. Accordingly, the requirements of a physician to
act as an expert witness should be similarly established.
Richard Spiwak

FAIR TRADE-VALIDITY OF DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER TO PRIVATE PERSONS
The proponents of the fair trade laws lost another round in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed a lower court, overturning one of its own previous opinions,' by holding invalid the nonsigner provision of the fair trade law. The plaintiff manufacturer had
sought to enjoin a retailer from cutting the price of the manufacturer's
trademarked product, basing its case on a price maintenance contract
which the plaintiff had obtained from another retailer. Under the nonsigner provision, 2 all retailers are compelled to charge the minimum price
specified in the fair trade contract, even though not parties to the
contract. The court ruled that the injunction should not be issued because the non-signer provision delegates legislative power to private
persons, in violation of the state constituticn.3 Thus Pennsylvania became
4
the twenty-third state to hold the non-signer provision unconstitutional.
Co. v. General Electric Co., 382 Pa. 369, 115 A.2d 361 (1955).
Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act, PA. STAT. tit. 73, !j8 (1935): "Wilfully and knowingly
advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated
in any contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of section one of this act,
whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is, or is not, a party
to such contract, is unfair competition and is ac:ionable at the suit of such vendor,
buyer or purchaser of such commodity."
a PA. CONST. art. II, § 1: "The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested
in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives."
4 See U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1961). See also Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 108 N.W.2d 365 (1961); Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v.
Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 139 Mont 15, 359 P.2d 6z4 (1961); American Home Products
Corp. v. Benny Homsey & Assoc., 361 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1961); Bulova Watch Co. v.
Zale Jewelry Co., 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 1962).
1Burche

2
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Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation v. White Cross Stores, Inc. 414
Pa. 95, 199 A. 2d 266 (1964).
This note will examine the unusual conflict of decisions which have
involved the delegation of legislative power to private persons. All courts
declare that legislative power may not be delegated to private persons,
and although they make no attempt to justify this rule, Dr. Horst P.
Ehmke has suggested that such power is based on a special trust placed in
the legislature by the people. 5 Since the people have entrusted the
legislature as the body most capable of making just laws, it is a betrayal of
this trust for the legislature to give law-making power to others, by whom
the people have not consented to be ruled. In many cases, the courts have
been asked to find that a law is invalid, as having delegated legislative
power to private persons. Without examining the rationale behind the
rule against delegation, the courts have not discovered any way of deciding whether there has been a delegation or not. The dispute on the nonsigner provision illustrates the confusion on this issue.
The Olin Mathieson case follows a line of recent cases 6 which hold
the non-signer provision invalid for delegating legislative power to private
persons. The reasoning of the Pennsylvania court is the same as that of
other courts holding the same view. By entering into a fair trade contract,
the manufacturer can compel all retailers to charge the price specified
in the contract. If he makes no contract, they are not bound by any
price. If he does make such a contract, it then becomes unlawful for
them to charge a lower price. Since he can make unlawful what was
lawful before, and can set the price which they are bound to follow, it is
concluded that he has price-fixing power, thereby causing a private
person to be delegated legislative power.
Other courts have held the provision valid,7 denying that it delegates
any law-making power to the manufacturer. They use the following
argument: 8 every law applies to a certain set of facts, and a restriction is
imposed when the facts arise. The non-signer provision says that when a
5 Ehmke, "Delegata Protestas Non Potest Delegari"-A Maxim of American Constitutional Law, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 50 (1961).

oE.g., Remington Arm Co. v. G.E.M. of St. Louis, Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 102 N.W.2d
528 (1960). Some courts rely on delegation as one ground for holding the provision
invalid. American Home Products Corp. v. Benny Homsey & Assoc., supra note 4;
Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co., supra note 4.
7 McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Government Employee's Dept. Store, 211 Tenn.
494, 365 S.W.2d 890 (1963). See 109 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 540 n. 7 (1961).
8 Contra, Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936);

Sears v. Western Thrift Stores, Inc., 10 Wash. 2d 372, 116 P.2d 756 (1940). These
cases argue that the retailer is not restricted, on the ground that he consents when
he buys the product.
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manufacturer enters into a price maintenance contract, it shall be unlawful for retailers to charge a lower price. In making the contract, the
manufacturer is not legislating, but is only influencing a "fact" or
"circumstance" which the legislature has prescribed will render pricecutting unlawful." The same argument is found in other cases concerning
delegation.' 0
Before the fair trade cases, most cases dealing with delegation to private
persons involved a majority forcing its will on a minority." For instance,
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.1 2 held invalid v. law permitting a majority of
miners and mineowners to set maximum hours and minimum wages for all
members of the industry. 13 However, other cases hold that approval of
the majority is just another "circumstance" or "contingency" on which
the legislature may validly make a law depend.' 4 For instance, Currin v.
Wallace' 5 held an agricultural regulation valid, though it did not become
effective until approved by a two-thirds vote of the growers affected.
The Supreme Court refused to find that the growers had any legislative
power, saying "here it is Congress that exercises its legislative authority
in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its application. The required favorable vote upon the referendum is one of these
conditions."'
The conflict arises because of the ambiguous term "legislative power".
Laws give power to many persons. A person has power to control his
own property, and he can often dictate who else may use it. He has
power to make lawful or unlawful the use of his own land, trademark,
or patent simply by giving or withholding his consent. Thus, he may
arbitrarily decide whether another's act is to be lawful. Though he has
9 Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 888, 291 P.2d 936,
940 (1955): "The private contracts are no more legislative in character than are
other acts or conduct of private parties undertaken as a prerequisite to the application of a statute."
10 See State ex rel. Crumpton v. Montgomery, 177 Ala. 212, 59 So. 294 (1912), wherein
the court said that every law applies to a subject, the existence of which may depend

on the will of one or more, but that this does not commit the law, only its application, to those able to affect the condition. In the Crumpton case, a law provided that

liquor could be sold in towns employing a policeman, thus allowing the town to make
the sale of liquor illegal by refusing to employ a policeman. The court held that

there was no delegation of power to the town.
11 See DAvis,

ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE,

§2.14 (1958).

12298 U.S.238 (1936).
'3 Accord, DuPont v.Liquor Control Commission, 136 Conn. 286, 71 A.2d 87
(1949); Hollingsworth v.State Board of Barber Examiners, 217 Ind. 373, 28 N.E.2d
64; Wilcher v.Sharp, 236 N.C. 308, 72 S.E.2d 662 (1952).
'4 Gannett v.Cook, 245 Iowa 750,61 N.W.2d 703 (1953).
15 306 U.S.1 (1939).

16Id. at 16.
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power to make unlawful what was lawful before, it is never contended
that he has been given "legislative power". The courts invalidating the
non-signer provision find that it gives the manufacturer power to fix the
price of his trademarked good, so they declare that he has "legislative
power." But they do not examine the meaning of "legislative power", and
thus overlook the various powers which private persons have.
One possible view of "legislative power" might account for the different views on the non-signer provision. "Legislative power" might be
the power to control the property of another, in contrast to the power
to control one's own property. Courts holding the provision valid state
that the trademark owner has a "property right" in the goodwill of his
trademark. 17 Thus, the provision is placed in the category with laws
giving men arbitrary power over their own property. On the other
hand, those courts invalidating the provision appear to consider that the
manufacturer is permitted to dictate the use of another person's property.
18
However, this distinction has not been stated or followed by the courts.
Either the court declares that a person has "legislative power", or they
say that the person only has power to influence a "circumstance" which
brings the case under the law. The following cases illustrate that it is
impossible to find any rationale in the conflicting decisions.
Several cases have dealt with laws permitting one man to dictate the
use of the property of others, by requiring his "consent" or "permission"
for such use. In 1887, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a law making it illegal to sell refreshments within a. mile of a camp meeting without
permission from those in charge. The law gives the meeting leaders the
power to dictate the use of property within a mile, by giving or withholding permission, but the court rejected the claim that this gave licensing power to the meeting leaders.' 9 In 1891, the Kentucky Supreme
Court accepted the delegation argument, and held that requiring a railroad to build a fence, if an adjoining landowner insisted, unlawfully
delegated power to the landowner. 20 But Kentucky has since upheld laws
17 Joseph Trinier Corp. v. Neil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N.E.2d 929 (1936); General Electric
Co. v. Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 (1956); Corning Glass
Works v. Max Dichter Co., 102 N.H. 505, 161 A.2d 569 (1960). The courts mention

the manufacturer's "property right" while discussing whether the provision violates
due process of law.

18 Contra, United States v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co., 163 Fed. 640 (9th Cir. 1908),
wherein the court rejected the claim that a law prohibiting a carrier from confining
stock in transit for more than 28 hours with an extension of 8 hours if the owner of
the stock consented was a delegation of legislative power to the owner of the stock.
567, 12 N.E. 79 (1887).
19 Meyers v. Baker, 120 111.
20

Ohio & N. Ry. v. Todd, 91 Ky. 175, 15 S.W. 56 (1891); see Annot., 11 L.R.A.

285 (1891).
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prohibiting the sale of liquor within 200 feet of certain private institutions without the consent of the institution, 21 and outlawing the mining
of coal within five feet of adjoining land without the consent of the adjoining landowner. 22 Thus, whether it is lawful to sell liquor, or to mine
coal, depends on the whim of a private person. An Ohio case 25 invalidated
a law against parking at a certain point in front of a railroad station,
without permission from the person in charge of the station. The property controlled is not another person's, but a public street. In 1886, a
requirement that a street railroad obtain the consent of another road
on the same street before operating was held not to give any legislitive
power to the other road. 24 It was called a mere conditionfor the -right
of a street railroad to operate.
Other cases resemble the fair trade case:3, 25 in that they involve permitting a seller to control the re-sale of his property. The Ohio Appellate
Court invalidated a law providing that no Dne could be licensed todeal
in new cars without authorization of the manufacturer. 26 . But in 1905,
Washington upheld a law prohibiting the ;:ale of tickets without a certificate from the carrier.27 If the carrier issued certificates to everyone,
it would be lawful for everyone to re-sell tickets. By refusing to issue
certificates, the carrier could make such sat es unlawful. The court held
that the carrier had no legislative power.
In all of these cases, a person had an option to make another's act
either lawful or unlawful. But people also have such an option when
they are permitted to restrict the use of their own land or patent. They
can either consent to a nuisance on their neighbor's land, or seek an
21

Beacon Liquors v. Martin, 279 Ky. 468, 131 S.W7.2d 446 (1939).

22

Whitaker v. Green River Coal Co., 276 Ky. 43, 122 S.W2d 1012 (1938).

'23City of Cincinnati v. Cook, 107 Ohio Sr. 223, 14(,N.E. 655 (1923).
24

In re Application of 34th Street Ry., 102 N.Y. 343, 7 N.E. 172 (1886).

E.g., United States v. Dettra Flag Co., 87 F. Supp. 8- (E.D.Pa. 1949) (insignias).
Contra, State v. Holland, 37 Mont. 393, 96 Pac. 719 (1908).
2 6
Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealer's and Salesmen's Licensing Bd v. Memphis Auto
Sales, 103 Ohio App.'347, 142 N.E.2d 268 (1957). See Blumenthal v. Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228, 368 P.2d 101 (1962), wherein the court held that a requirement of five years experience with a dispensing optician as a prerequisite. for a license
was a delegation of legislative power to the dispensing opticians.
27 In re O'Neill, 41 Wash. 174, 83 Pac. 104 (1905). See Allardt v. People, 197 1i.
501, 64 N.E. 533 (1902), wherein the court held that a law prohibiting the resale of
tickets stamped "non-transferable" by the carrier wa; an invalid delegation to the carrier. Contra, Samuelson v. State, 116 Tenn. 470, 95 S.W.1012 (1906). See also Whaley
v. State, 168 Ala. 152, 52 So. 941 (1909), wherein the court upheld a law giving a carrier power to make "reasonable" rules regarding transfers. For there common carrier
cases, see Price v. Clawns, 180 Md. 532, 25 A.2d 672 (1942); State v. Corbett, 57 Minn.
345, 59 N.W. 317 (1894); Jannin v. State, 51 S.W. 1126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1899).
25
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injunction against it, thereby deciding whether the use of adjoining land
is lawful. It can be said then that persons often have the option of
rendering another's act lawful or unlawful, and courts which have held
laws, allowing such an option, to be invalid as a "delegation of legislative
power", seem to have overlooked this treatment. Thus, such courts are
subject to the argument that it is the legislature which has laid down
restrictions, to be imposed under certain circumstances, and the private
person's act is just a "circumstance" which brings a situation under the
law.
The courts which strike down the non-signer provision may be concerned with the plight of the retailer whose price is fixed. But most
courts permit the legislature to fix prices, and the retailer is equally oppressed whether his price is subject to the whim of the legislature or of
someone else. A few courts hold that all men are free to set their own
price; the legislature is held to have practically no price-fixing power, and
thus none to delegate. If the courts are interested in the retailer's freedom, they should adopt this position, rather than the pretext that the
legislature has delegated its power to the manufacturer.
George Lincoln
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-JURISDICTION-DEGREE OF
BUSINESS ACTIVITY NECESSARY TO SUBJECT THE
FOREIGN CORPORATION TO JURISDICTION
Defendant, a New Jersey corporation, sold a machine of special design
to an Illinois partnership, which in turn loaned it to the plaintiff, a Georgia
resident. In the contract of sale, the defendant expressly warranted that
the machine would be capable of producing certain tubing. When it
failed to function properly, the defendant undertook to repair it at the
request of the plaintiff. In the course of this operation, defendant's representatives came into Georgia. Under their supervision, expenses in excess
of $11,000 were incurred, and plaintiff paid this amount. In the plaintiff's
action for breach of warranty, based on doing business in Georgia, the
defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that
the defendant corporation had not been doing business in the State of
Georgia. The trial court entered judgment sustaining the plea and this
holding was affirmed in the court of appeals which ruled that the
defendant's activities did not constitute doing business in Georgia.
Lamex, Inc. v. Sterling Extruder Corporation, 109 Ga. App. 92, 135
S.E.2d 445 (1964).

